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Why would China target the United States
with 13 strategic, questionably accurate, nuclear
missiles when the United States could respond, not
with a baker's dozen, but with thousands
of nuclear warheads of proven accuracy?

A recent CIA report said that 13 of China's 18 long-ran ge missiles are targeted at U.S. cities. Assuming
the report to be accurate, it seems quite clear that the People's Republic of China considers the United
States to be its Iong-term enemy, not unlike the view held by Japan in the two decades preceding the
attack on Pearl Harbor. Given the above, it is a certainty that the United States has already, or can within
minutes, target hundreds of mainland China cities, military installations, major industrial activities and
key transport hubs. It would seem the last thing leaders of the People's Republic of China would want is
an exchange of missiles. So, what is the logic behind the PRCs decision to commit most of its long-range
missile force against the United States? What clash of U.S.-China interests would be important enough to
risk igniting a war between the two countries? Some possible issues include:
(a) A showdown over human rights abuses in China and/or China's oppression and brutal treatment
of the Tibetan people. Conclusion: Much rhetoric, but conflict between the United States and China over
the issue is highly unlikely.
(b) Overt Chinese military aggression against other East Asian countries. Given firm U.S.
commitments insuring, the security of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines, overt
aggression in northern East Asia by China's leaders is considered unlikely. Nor does China have a navy
capable of mounting a sustained threat to nations farther to the south. e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Brunei. Moreover, the United States has a mutual security treaty with Australia and a small naval
presence in Singapore, while Thailand's security benefits from a number of defense arrangements with
the United States. Local skirmishes over the Spratley and Parcel Islands are quite possible but would not
directly involve the United States.
(c) Border conflicts with PRC neighbors--Russia, India and Vietnam. Two of the three are nuclear
powers while Vietnam has demonstrated it has the ability to not only defend its border but inflict
significant losses on the People's Liberation Army should it attempt an invasion (Vietnam has the 2d
largest ground force in East Asia). In the north, economic gains from a PRC-Russia rapprochement are
sufficiently great to minimize the likelihood of local border incidents escalating into a major conflict.
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And while India is indirectly supportive of Tibetan autonomy, it otherwise has no designs on PRC
territory, but like Vietnam, has demonstrated a capability to protect its northern borders. Other nations on
China's borders--Nepal, Bhutan, and Laos maintain a benign relation with Beijing, with no history of
major border incidents. For all intent and purpose, Myanmar (Burma) is a PRC ally. Direct American
intervention should even a major border conflict breakout in any of the above regions is highly unlikely.
(d) A change in the U.S. "One China" policy, that is, diplomatically recognize Taiwan should the
island opt for independence. This is extremely unlikely given that America's "One China" policy has
been endorsed by both Republican and Democrat administrations. Recognition, should it occur, would
only follow after, not before, a conflict with China. The United States has also made it quite clear that
should the Republic of China on Taiwan declare its independence, there would be no military
intervention on its behalf..
(e) The People's Republic of China decides to use military force to reunite Taiwan with the
mainland using any or no pretext for its action and is fully aware of the U.S. commitment to assist
Taiwan as spelled out in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 968, 96th Congress) Section 2b (4,5,6) of
the Act is quite clear in this respect.
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific
area and of grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people
on Taiwan.
It is argued here that only the use of military force by the PRC against Taiwan could trigger a U.S.
response that could lead to conflict. (The PRC has a number of options should it seek reunification
with Taiwan by military means -- a sea blockade, an air-sea blockade, invasion or by any combination
of the above.)
The next question is -- what would be the dimensions of the conflict should it come? There is an axiom
as old as military doctrine itself that says the opponent that can choose the location and terms
(parameters) of the conflict will be the likely winner. General Robert E. Lee ignored the axiom, and with
the failure of Pickett's charge, doomed hopes for Southern independence.
With this axiom in mind, what is the most likely strategy of the People's Republic of China should
conflict with the United States come about? First, limit the weapons of engagement, i.e., avoid a nuclear
exchange of strategic missiles. How could this be accomplished? By deploying a sufficient number of
strategic, so-called "Long March" missiles against a sufficient number of U.S. targets. The operative
word is "sufficient." In other words, how many PRC missiles would have to be U.S.-targeted for the
United States to accede to a defacto agreement that neither the United States or China would launch
missiles against one another's territory, that is, against mainland China or the United States and its
territories? Thirteen? Twenty? The point is that China does not have to even come close in matching the
United States missile for missile.
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The second PRC task or goal would be to minimize the effect of U.S. air power based in Japan and the
strike capability of the U.S. 7th fleet. In the first case, Japan could be threatened with nuclear armed
missiles (DF21/M9) if it allowed U.S. based aircraft to support Taiwan militarily. Here lies the American
dilemma. To threaten China with a nuclear counter strike and risk a strategic missile attack on the U.S. or
to "go it alone" using U.S. Pacific island (e.g. Guam) based aircraft and 7th fleet carrier based planes.
And what of the 7th fleet? China's strategy here would be to minimize its effectiveness and the best way
to accomplish that is to force it as far back in the Western Pacific as possible. This would require state of
the art land and sea based cruise missiles, in sufficient numbers capable of attacking and sinking surface
combatants, including aircraft carriers.
Thus outlined is China's two missile policy. The first leg is a strategic missile capability with pinpoint
accuracy a secondary consideration. What is really the difference if ground zero is Sacramento or San Francisco
or Tokyo or Yokohama? The second is having a large inventory of accurate land and sea based
cruise missiles. Of the two, the latter is far the more important.
American Options
To counter the threat of a PRC invasion of Taiwan, that is, make such a decision one of high risk and
high cost, the United States could:
(1) Accelerate U.S. missile defense. Till now concentration has been on acquiring technology while
avoiding hardware deployment. However, even deployment of a less than accurate, less than complete
defense would still give China's military leadership pause. Second and more important, budget whatever
is necessary for cruise missile defense to insure that the 7th fleet can accomplish its stated
purpose--power projection in the Western Pacific which translates into being near enough to Taiwan to
make a difference.
(2) Give serious consideration to providing Japan with a stockpile of nuclear weapons with delivery
systems capable of reaching all geographic areas of China and without a U.S. veto on their use. One
positive aspect of this option would be that Japan would have a counter to a threatened PRC nuclear
attack. The decision to use nuclear weapons would not be America's to make, a fact that should weigh
heavily on any PRC decision to threaten Japan. Even discussion of such an option in the Congress could
influence a decision by the PRC to attack Taiwan. .
(3) Make it clear to the PRC that as soon as a military threat against Taiwan is confirmed, the United
States will deploy air, ground and naval forces on Taiwan. Time would be of the essence for this option
with detailed plans to carry out such a deployment well rehearsed and in place.
(4) Make it clear that a PRC attack on Taiwan would invoke a worldwide naval war, that is, an attack on
Chinese merchant shipping coupled with an air-sea blockade of mainland China.
The above options are well within the capability of the United States. Nonetheless with respect as to how
a conflict with the PRC would be fought remains the same. To the greatest extent possible, the United
States must deny China's military leadership the exclusive choice of location, tactics and weapons.
Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., Ph.D., is Emeritus Professor of Management and Economics, Clemson
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